In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rentdissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff shares arise as the outcome of the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the answer is shown to be positive.
Introduction
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria of imperfectly discriminating contests in which risk-neutral players i simultaneously expend efforts x i ≥ 0 in order to increase their probability p i of winning a prize with value v > 0.
There is an extensive literature discussing the existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of such contests under a variety of assumptions on the contest success function, i.e., the map from the efforts of the players into their winning probabilities. 1 Here we focus on contests with two players and consider the class of asymmetric contest success functions p i = α i x r i /(α 1 x r 1 + α 2 x r 2 ), axiomatized in Clark and Riis (1998) . We show that, for given v, this class is rich enough to support any positive payoffs for the players, summing to less than the value of the prize, as the outcome of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for appropriately chosen values of the effectiveness parameters α i > 0 and the decisiveness parameter r > 0. Given the parameters of the contest success function, the corresponding equilibrium payoff shares are independent of v. The proof is straightforward and constructive in the sense that for every division of the value v into payoff shares and a dissipated share we provide the parameter values which implement the division.
The motivation for our work is familiar from the economic theory of bargaining (cf. Muthoo, 1999, Chapter 1.2) : When a contest is one of many ingredients of an economic model it is convenient to describe a contest in terms of its induced equilibrium payoffs rather than dwelling on the intricacies of the underlying non-cooperative model. Our analysis provides foundations for such an approach by (i) showing that any linear, but otherwise arbitrary, sharing rule can be used to describe the outcome of a contest, and (ii) by exhibiting the simple one-to-one relationship between the parameters of this sharing rule and the parameters of the contest success function.
For the symmetric version (α 1 = α 2 ) of the contest success function the symmetric version of our result (i.e., any division in which both players obtain identical, positive equilibrium payoffs summing to less than the prize can be supported) is immediate from the results in Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) . The point of our analysis is that introducing a simple asymmetry in the contest success function suffices to produce a result which provides a generalization of the asymmetric Nash-bargaining solution to contests.
Model
Risk neutral players i = 1, 2 simultaneously choose efforts x i ≥ 0 at cost x i . Both players assign value v > 0 to winning the prize (and value 0 to not winning the prize). Player i's payoff function is
where the probability p i (x 1 , x 2 ) that player i wins the prize is given by the contest success function
with α i > 0 and r > 0. 2 As payoff functions are homogenous of degree zero in α 1 and α 2 , it is without loss of generality to assume α 1 + α 2 = 1 and we will do so throughout the following. Let
denote the corresponding set of feasible parameters for the contest success function. The parameters of a contest are (α 1 , α 2 , r, v) ∈ P × R ++ . A purestrategy Nash equilibrium, or simply equilibrium, of a contest is a strategy
Every equilibrium (x * 1 , x * 2 ) gives rise to a division of the value of the prize into equilibrium payoffs u * i = U i (x * 1 , x * 2 ) for the two players and a rent-
Each player i can assure a positive payoff by choosing the strategy x i = 0 and for any strategy combination (x 1 , x 2 ) the sum of the two players' payoffs is less than v. Hence, for every equilibrium
That is, we can view any equilibrium (x * 1 , x * 2 ) of the contest as inducing a division of the value of the prize into payoff shares s * 1 and s * 2 for the two contestants and a dissipated share s * 3 . We refer to these shares as equilibrium shares.
Result
Proposition 1. For any (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ) ∈ ∆ satisfying s * 3 > 0 there exists a unique (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P such that any contest with parameters (α 1 , α 2 , r, v) has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (x * 1 , x * 2 ) with equilibrium shares (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ).
To prove this proposition we establish two lemmas. Lemma 1 delineates the set P * ⊂ P of parameters of the contest success function for which a unique equilibrium exists and determines equilibrium strategies and shares as functions of the parameters. Lemma 2 then completes the proof by exhibiting, for any shares in ∆ satisfying s 3 > 0, the unique parameters in P * yielding these shares as equilibrium shares.
Lemma 1. A contest with parameters (α 1 , α 2 , r, v) ∈ P × R ++ has a purestrategy Nash equilibrium if and only if (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P * holds, where
If a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique with equilibrium efforts
and equilibrium shares
Most of the proof of Lemma 1, which we have relegated to the appendix, is straightforward. Taking the existence of equilibrium for granted, uniqueness can be established directly by considering the appropriate first order conditions. 3 These imply (Mills, 1959 ) that equilibrium efforts are identical and given by (7). Equations (8) and (9) for the equilibrium payoff shares s * 1 and s * 2 are then immediate: with equal efforts the probability that contestant i wins the prize is α i , so that s * i = α i − x * i /v. Similarly, equal equilibrium efforts imply that the dissipated rent is twice the individual effort, yielding the expression for s * 3 in (10). Further, as equilibrium payoff shares must be positive, it is apparent from (8) and (9) that r ≤ 1/ max{α 1 , α 2 } is necessary for the existence of equilibrium. Showing that the same condition suffices for the existence of equilibrium is more subtle as player's payoff functions are not concave in own effort for r > 1.
Lemma 2. For any (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ) ∈ ∆ satisfying s * 3 > 0 there exists a unique (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P * , given by
such that equations (8) -(10) hold.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we show that (α 1 , α 2 , r) as given by (11) -(13) is in P * : Adding equations (11) and (12) yields α 1 + α 2 = 1. From (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ) ∈ ∆ and s * 3 > 0 we have |s * 2 − s * 1 | < 1, so that (11) -(13) imply α 1 > 0, α 2 > 0, and r > 0. Hence, (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P. Given (11) and (12), equation (13) can be written as
Because
equation (14) then implies r ≤ 1/ max{α 1 , α 2 }, yielding (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P * . Second, we show that the parameter values given in (11) -(13) are the unique parameter values in P * such that (8) -(10) hold. Replacing (α 1 , α 2 , r) in (8) -(10) by the expressions on the right sides of (11) -(13) and simplifying shows that equations (8) -(10) are satisfied. Vice versa, suppose that for (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P * equations (8) -(10) hold. Subtracting equation (9) from equation (8), we find α 1 − α 2 = s * 1 − s * 2 . Using α 1 + α 2 = 1 this yields (11) and (12). From (10) we have r = s * 3 /(2α 1 α 2 ). Replacing α 1 and α 2 by the right sides of (11) and (12) then yields (13).
Discussion
For given parameters (α 1 , α 2 , r) ∈ P * of the contest success function, the resulting equilibrium shares (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ) are independent of the value of the prize v. Consequently, Proposition 1 may be interpreted as the statement that any linear sharing rule in which players receive a positive share of the prize as a payoff and a strictly positive share of the prize is dissipated can arise as an equilibrium outcome of the asymmetric two-person contest we consider.
The restriction to sharing rules featuring a non-zero amount of rent dissipation, arising from our assumption that the decisiveness parameter r is strictly positive, is natural when considering a contest rather than a bargaining situation. Linearity of the sharing rule holds because the contest success functions we consider is homogeneous of degree zero in effort which corresponds to Axiom A6 both in Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) . More general contest success function, e.g. of the commonly considered ratio-form p i = f i (x i )/(f 1 (x 1 ) + f 2 (x 2 )) (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997; Cornes and Hartley, 2005) , will implement additional, non-linear sharing rules. Given the complexity of characterizing pure-strategy equilibria for such contest success function, it seems unlikely that a sharp characterization analogous to Proposition 1 can be obtained for such an extension. Similarly, while it would be desirable to extend our result to asymmetric contests with more than two players, the straightforward generalization of our result is precluded because multiplicity of equilibria is endemic in such games. The question which linear sharing rules are implementable in n-player contests by homogenous contest success functions when our uniqueness requirement is relaxed appears more tractable. We leave this for further research. payoff functions are differentiable on R 2 ++ , the first order conditions
are then necessary for (x 1 , x 2 ) to be an equilibrium. This yields x 1 = x 2 . Substituting back into (16) and (17) we obtain (x * 1 , x * 2 ) as given in (7) as the unique candidate for an equilibrium with corresponding equilibrium utilities
The expressions for the equilibrium shares in (8) -(10) are then immediate. Because player i can secure a payoff of zero by choosing x i = 0, any equilibrium must satisfy min{u * 1 , u * 2 } ≥ 0. From (18) and (19) this condition is equivalent to r ≤ 1/ max{α 1 , α 2 }. To finish the proof it remains to show that this condition is also sufficient for (x * 1 , x * 2 ) to be an equilibrium. Towards this end, consider the second derivatives (well-defined on R 2 ++ )
where A 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = (α 1 α 2 rx r−2 1 x r 2 v)/(α 1 x r 1 + α 2 x r 2 ) 3 > 0 and A 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = (α 1 α 2 rx r−2 2 x r 1 v)/(α 1 x r 1 + α 2 x r 2 ) 3 > 0. The sign of these derivatives is the sign of the terms in square brackets in (20) and (21). For 0 < r ≤ 1 these terms are strictly negative, so that the payoff of a player is concave in own effort, ensuring that the solution to the first order conditions (16) and (17) satisfies the equilibrium conditions (4). For r > 1 the terms in square brackets in (20) and (21) have exactly one sign change in x 1 and x 2 , respectively, from positive to negative, so that the same holds for the second derivatives. Consequently, the first derivatives are unimodal (first increasing, then decreasing) in own effort. Hence, if (for given x 2 > 0) the first order condition (16) has a solutionx 1 > 0 satisfying U 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ U 1 (0, x 2 ) = 0, then this solution solves max x 1 ≥0 U 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and, similarly, if (for given x 1 > 0) the first order condition (17) has a solutionx 2 > 0 satisfying U 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) ≥ U 1 (x 1 , 0) = 0, then this solution solves max x 2 ≥0 U 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). From this the desired result is immediate.
